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BLAINE'S NAME IN VAIN?: STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
SCHOOL CHOICE, AND CHARITABLE CHOICE
JILL GOLDENZIELf
ABSTRACT
This article explores the growing controversy over "no-funding pro-
visions, " state constitutional provisions that restrict state funding of reli-
gious institutions. These provisions, allegedly rooted in anti-Catholic
bigotry, may threaten state implementation of school choice programs
and faith-based initiatives involving public funding of religious social
service organizations. This article argues that these no-funding provi-
sions, which are commonly termed "Blaine Amendments," "Little
Blaines, " or "Baby Blaines," are often unrelated to the failed federal
Blaine Amendment, and do not always share the federal amendment's
infamous anti-Catholic history. In the first study of its type, this article
surveys the language and history of constitutional provisions prohibiting
funding of religious institutions in all fifty states, and details the constitu-
tional history and judicial interpretation of these provisions in eight rep-
resentative states: Ohio, Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, Colorado, Michi-
gan, Vermont, and Maine. This article concludes that the fates of school
vouchers and faith-based initiatives will not rest on the so-called "Blaine
Amendments," but on the ideological and jurisprudential tendencies of
state judiciaries. Debate over school choice and charitable choice
should therefore move from courtrooms to the political arena.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has just multiplied the controversy over original
intent in constitutional law by fifty. In 2002, the Supreme Court held
that the participation of religious schools in Cleveland's school voucher
program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris' did not violate the federal estab-
lishment clause.2 Yet two years later, the Supreme Court implicitly ap-
proved the use of state constitutional amendments to provide stronger
protection from religious establishment than that guaranteed by the fed-
eral constitution. 3  These "no-funding" provisions, which prohibit state
funding of religious institutions, exist in most state constitutions.4 State
courts may invoke these provisions to block school choice and charitable
choice programs, like the Cleveland voucher program, that involve pub-
lic funding of faith-based educational or social service organizations.
However, pro-voucher and pro-charitable choice activists argue that the
prejudicial, anti-Catholic history of these provisions renders them inva-
lid.5 Will state jurists apply original intent analysis, strict construction,
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643-44, 662-63.
3. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
4. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 263; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10,
art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34, art. IX § 7; DEL.
CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. VII; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1;
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. 10 § 3; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6; KY. CONST. § 189; MASS.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (amended 1917, 1974); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art.
XIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 66, art. 8, § 208; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. IX, § 8; MONT. CONST.
art. X, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.M.
CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA.
CONST. art. III, § 15, art. III, § 29; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3, art. VIII, § 16;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. VII, § 5 (C); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4, art. X, § 9; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. III, § 36, art. VII, §
8.
5. See generally Brief for Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729 (stating that one
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or another form of interpretation to these provisions? And how will their
decisions affect the future of school choice and charitable choice in the
states?
These questions are currently fueling voucher debates across the
country. Spurred by the Court's ruling in Zelman, school choice advo-
cates have launched new political initiatives in states across the country.
In the past three years, Florida and Colorado, among others, have estab-
6lished new school choice programs. Congress recently approved the
first federal school voucher program for Washington, D.C.7 School
choice proponents successfully added referenda to the 2000 election bal-
lots in California and Michigan. 8  Although these proposals were de-
feated, 9 the solidification of Republican control in the 2004 elections has
increased the likelihood that other states will soon create voucher pro-
grams. In 2000 alone, "at least 21 states ... proposed voucher legisla-
tion. . . ,"0 A bitter voucher battle is currently underway in South Caro-
lina. I'
No-funding provisions are also likely to be at issue in litigation over
state involvement in "charitable choice" programs. The 1996 Welfare
Reform Act first introduced provisions, known informally as charitable
choice legislation, that allow faith-based organizations to participate in
new federal welfare programs. 12 Since then, charitable choice provisions
have been incorporated into several other pieces of federal legislation.
13
In 2001, President George W. Bush established the White House Office
of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to oversee efforts to encour-
age the participation of religious and community-based organizations in
argument in opposition of Washington's no-funding provision alleges that the provision is based on
anti-religious and, in particular, anti-Catholic, sentiment).
6. FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-56-101 to -110 (2004).
7. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. C, tit. III, 126-34 (2004)
(authorizing budget, including funds for District of Columbia school voucher program).
8. Ellen M. Halstead, Comment, After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, School Voucher Pro-
grams Can Exclude Religious Schools, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147, 154 (2004). See generally The
Heritage Foundation, School Choice: California (April 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Education/Schools/california.cfm; The Heritage Foundation, School Choice: Michigan (April 2004),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/Schools/michigan.cfin.
9. Halstead, supra note 8, at 154.
10. National Conference of State Legislatures, School Vouchers,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/voucher.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
11. See generally Bill Robinson, School Voucher Measure Criticized, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Oct. 8, 2004, at B 1 (discussing the battle over a movement in the South Carolina legislature to
give tax breaks to parents who send children to private or religious schools).
12. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a (West 2005) (permitting participation by faith-based organiza-
tions in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Welfare to Work programs). Since the
passage of this act, all subsequent legislative provisions permitting the participation of religious
organizations in federally-funded programs have become informally known as "charitable choice"
provisions.
13. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9920 (West 2005) (stating that religious organizations are in-
cluded as nongovernmental providers under the Community Services Block Grant Program); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300x-65 (West 2005); Charitable Choice Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 1991
(2001).
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the activities of all federal agencies. 14 Currently, twenty-eight governors
and the mayor of Washington, D.C. have established or are establishing
similar offices or liaisons to assist religious and community-based or-
ganizations in their respective states.' 5 Charitable choice programs have
met a great deal of opposition on both the federal and state levels.
16
The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey17 has un-
earthed the no-funding provisions as a potential way to block both school
choice and charitable choice programs. In Davey, the state of Washing-
ton revoked a college student's merit-based "Promise Scholarship" after
he declared a major in Pastoral Ministries. 18 The state premised its revo-
cation of the scholarship on the state's no-funding provision, which pro-
hibits the use of state funds for religious education. 19 The Washington
Supreme Court had previously invoked its no-funding provision to pro-
hibit the use of state vocational training funds to support a blind man's
pastoral studies at a Christian college.2° While the district court granted
summary judgment for the state, the Ninth Circuit reversed in July 2002,
invigorating school choice proponents by invalidating the state law that
excludes theology students from the scholarship program.2'
In February 2004, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 22 The
Court held that state constitutions may extend greater religion-state sepa-
ration and greater guarantees of religious liberty to state citizens beyond
those afforded by the federal constitution. 3 The Court reasoned that the
state's interest in not funding theological instruction was based on a de-
sire to avoid establishment of religion, and not on hostility toward relig-
ion.24 Thus, denying the scholarship to theology students was permissi-
ble.
25
In amicus briefs in Davey and elsewhere, school choice proponents
have argued that the no-funding provisions are relics of anti-Catholic
14. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
15. The White House, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: State Liaisons or
Offices for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/
fbci/contact.html#liaisons (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
16. See generally Jill Goldenziel, Administratively Quirky, Constitutionally Murky: The Bush
Faith-Based Initiative, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 359 (2004/2005).
17. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
18. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750.
20. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1119-20 (Wash. 1989).
21. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750, 760; see Institute for Justice, Ninth Circuit Ruling in Religious
Funding Case Could Remove "Blaine Amendment" Obstacle to School Choice (July 19, 2002),
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/locke_v_davey/7_19 02pr.html.
22. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
23. Locke, 540 U.S. at 719-22.
24. Id. at 721.
25. Id.
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bigotry, or "Blaine Amendments, 26 which violate the Free Exercise and
Equal Protection clauses and should be repealed. 27 The Washington pro-
vision and others like it, also known as "Little Blaines" or "Baby
Blaines," are nicknamed after a similar federal constitutional amendment
proposed by Congressman James G. Blaine in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.28 However, in a footnote, the Court stated that the provision in
dispute in Davey was not a Blaine Amendment, since Article I, Section
11 of the Washington Constitution originated in the Federal Enabling Act
of 1889, and not in an Anti-Catholic movement.29 Since "neither Davey
nor amici have established a credible connection between the [Federal]
Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11," the Court found that "the [Fed-
eral] Blaine Amendment's history is simply not before us."'30  The Su-
preme Court's treatment of the Federal Blaine Amendment's history in
Davey will make it harder for school choice and charitable choice propo-
nents to advance historical arguments against the Blaine Amendments in
lower courts.
However, the specter of Blaine still remains in those states whose
amendments have a more tangible connection to the history of the federal
Blaine Amendment. School choice and charitable choice activists have
launched initiatives and lawsuits specifically targeting these no-fumding
provisions.31 Many view these "no-funding provisions" as a bar to
school choice and charitable choice programs.32 Confirming these fears,
Florida's appellate court, sitting en banc, recently affirmed a lower
court's ruling that the state's school choice program is unconstitutional
because it conflicts with the state's no-funding provision.33 The case is
26. See, e.g., Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 22118852.
27. See, e.g., id; Robert William Gall, The Past Should not Shackle the Present. The Revival
of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L.
413, 436-37 (2003); Tony Mauro, Voucher Advocates Plan Next Push to High Court (Aug. 5,2002),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1024079086859 (discussing controversy over Blaine
Amendments as it relates to the voucher debate); Eric W. Treene, The Grand Finale is Just the Be-
ginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle Over Blaine Amendments, http://www.fed-
soc.org/pdf/FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
28. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 26.
29. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
30. Id.
31. See generally The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments: What are
Blaine Amendments? (2003), http://www.blaineamendments.org/Intro/whatis.html (arguing that the
Blaine Amendments are anti-Catholic relics and should be repealed).
32. See, e.g., Gall, supra note 27, at 414, 431; Mauro, supra note 27; Holly Lebowitz Rossi,
State Constitutions Are Next Hurdles in Vouchers Fight (Aug. 8, 2002),
http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID-1413; Treene, supra note 27.
33. The court held:
For a court to interpret the no-aid provision as adding nothing [beyond that language
which is identical to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution] to article I, section 3
of the Florida Constitution would require that court to ignore the clear meaning of the
text of the provision and its formative history.
Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 343-44, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (en banc).
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currently on appeal before Florida's Supreme Court.3 4 School choice and
charitable choice supporters fear the impact of such a ruling on other
state programs,35 and supporters of school choice fear that other state and
federal courts will adopt a similar interpretation. 36 For this reason, the
so-called "Blaine Amendments" have been dubbed the "most prominent
weapon" of school choice opponents in the wake of Zelman.
37
However, the threat of the no-funding provisions to school choice
and charitable choice programs is overstated. The tainted past of the
Federal Blaine Amendment and its relevance to modem state jurispru-
dence is exaggerated. Only scant historical records and incomplete con-
stitutional convention journals document the enactment of these amend-
ments in the states, and the few available accounts reveal little evidence
of bigotry.38 Whatever anti-Catholic animus might have lain behind the
no-funding provisions at their inception has not yet been shown to influ-
ence current state jurisprudence. Also, rather than being an insurmount-
able obstacle to school choice and charitable choice legislation, the no-
funding provisions appear to be quite malleable in the hands of state ju-
rists. Several state supreme courts have upheld school choice programs
by reinterpreting their no-funding provisions or evading the implications
of their text altogether.39
This paper argues that the ambiguous history of the no-funding pro-
visions renders them helpful to neither side of the school choice and
charitable choice debates. Despite the potential implications of the his-
tory of the state no-funding provisions for political and legal battles over
school choice and charitable choice programs, no study yet compares the
legislative and legal history of the no-funding provisions in each individ-
ual state. Here, I begin this project by presenting a general discussion of
the current case law and scholarship on the no-funding provisions and
related provisions in all fifty states. I then focus on eight representative
states, detailing the legislative history, political context, and case law
pertinent to their no-funding provisions. After discussing the signifi-
cance of the interpretation of the no-funding provisions in the field of
state constitutional law, I conclude by elaborating on the implications of
34. See generally Voucher Ruling May Take Awhile, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 21, 2004, at 6B
(stating that the Florida Supreme Court has refused to expedite the appeal over Florida's voucher
law).
35. Linda Kleindienst, For Now, Students Can Use Vouchers; Gov. Jeb Bush's Appeal Lets
Kids Attend Religious Schools While the Issue is in Court, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2002, at A1;
Linda Kleindienst, Bush Appeals Ruling that Tossed Vouchers, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale,
Fla.), Aug. 7, 2002, at 6B.
36. Kleindienst, For Now, Students Can Use Vouchers; Gov. Jeb Bush's Appeal Lets Kids
Attend Religious Schools While the Issue is in Court at A1; Kleindienst, Bush Appeals Ruling that
Tossed Vouchers at 6B.
37. Gall, supra note 27, at 414.
38. See Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5.
39. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
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the state no-funding provisions for the debates over school choice and
charitable choice.
I. RELEVANT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Two primary types of state constitutional provisions present poten-
tial obstacles to school choice and charitable choice programs: no-
funding provisions and compelled support provisions. Many states have
both provisions.4 ° Scholars disagree over the precise meaning of what
constitutes a no-funding provision or a compelled support provision.41
Under the broadest reading, only three states have neither no-funding
provisions nor compelled support provisions: Louisiana, Maine, and
North Carolina.42 These provisions may exist as distinct constitutional
sections or as part of one religion-related section that includes a state's
free exercise and/or establishment clauses.
A. No-Funding Provisions: The So-Called "Blaine Amendments"
The first category of state constitutional provisions that may serve
as a bar to school choice and charitable choice programs explicitly pro-
hibits public funding of religious institutions.43 These provisions are
often called "Blaine Amendments," a name which stems from a similar,
federal constitutional amendment that Congressman James G. Blaine of
Maine proposed in 1876.44 The Blaine Amendment was drafted in the
wake of controversies over the public funding of sectarian education and
religious exercises in the public schools.45  Beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, Catholic immigrants increasingly began to lobby for,
and receive, parochial school funding.46  Non-Catholics responded by
calling for legislation prohibiting public funding of "sectarian" schools.47
Two federal constitutional amendments to this end were introduced in
Congress in 1871 and 1872, but both bills failed.48 In an 1875 speech
before the convention of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee,
President Grant came out in support of such an amendment, encouraging
Americans to resolve that "not one dollar," appropriated for the support
of free schools "shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian
schools," and for religion to be left to "the family altar, the Church, and
40. Halstead, supra note 8, at 167, 171.
41. See id at 167.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38
(1992).
45. Id. at 41-42; Steven K. Green, Blaming Blaine: Understanding the Blaine Amendment
and the No-Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107 (2004). Green's two articles
present the most complete treatments of the history of the federal Blaine Amendment available. Cf
Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65, 96 (2002).
46. Green, supra note 44, at 42-43.
47. Id. at 43. See generally Green, supra note 45.
48. Green, supra note 44, at 43-44.
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the private school, supported entirely by private contributions. 49
Grant's paean to the importance of "Keep[ing] the Church and State for-
ever separate" 50 was subsequently praised in newspapers, Protestant pub-
lications, and "free thought" journals alike.5'
Blaine, an ambitious politician with presidential aspirations,52
seized the opportunity to rally behind the President and unite the Repub-
lican Party. 3 He proposed a constitutional amendment that would fulfill
Grant's ideal, providing that:
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious
sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided
between religious sects or denominations.
54
Then, as now, most religious schools were Catholic schools and Blaine's
"non-sectarianism" often, but not exclusively, served as a facade for his
followers' anti-Catholic sentiments.55 However, Blaine maintained that
he was not anti-Catholic, and no evidence suggests that he had any per-
sonal animosity toward Catholics.56 Blaine's mother was Catholic and
his daughters were educated in Catholic schools. 57  Publicly, Blaine
maintained that the amendment was merely meant to settle the "School
Question," the day's most heated political issue.58 Although the federal
Blaine Amendment failed narrowly in the Senate in 1876, 59 many states
subsequently adopted similar language in their constitutions, and such
provisions have been dubbed "Blaine Amendments."
B. Compelled Support Provisions
Besides no-funding provisions, many state constitutions have
"compelled support" provisions that may also be construed to prohibit
school choice and charitable choice programs. Compelled support provi-
sions provide that no citizen of a state will be compelled by the state to
49. Green, supra note 44, at 47-48 (quoting President Ulysses S. Grant, Speech before the
Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Sept. 30, 1875).
50. Green, supra note 44, at 48.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 49.
53. See id. at 48-53.
54. Green, supra note 44, at 53 n.96 (quoting President Ulysses S. Grant, Speech before the
Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Sept. 30, 1875).
55. For a thorough discussion of non-Sectarianism as more than anti-Catholicism, see gener-
ally Feldman, supra note 45, and Green, supra note 45.
56. Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 23 n.65.
57. Id.
58. Green, supra note 44, at 54; Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 23 n.65. Green
also notes that evidence substantiates Blaine's lack of personal animosity toward Catholics. Green,
supra note 44, at 54 n. 103.
59. Green, supra note 44, at 67.
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attend or support religious institutions. 60  The language of these provi-
sions originated in Virginia's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,
authored by Thomas Jefferson. 61 Arguing that civil authority should not
interfere with religion, the Bill proclaimed that "[n]o man shall be com-
pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry
whatsoever .... , James Madison introduced the bill in the Virginia
legislature in January 1786, and with the support of a broad coalition of
Protestant sects, it passed. 63  Later, Virginia adopted a similar "com-
pelled support" provision in its state constitution, and several of the other
early state constitutions followed suit, including Pennsylvania and Ver-
mont.64 Today, twenty-nine states have compelled support provisions
65
modeled from Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom and
based on a shared distaste for the practices of taxation and coercion to
support an established church. 66 Like the no-funding provisions, at least
one state's compelled support provision has been used to prohibit a
school choice program.67
II. MODERN BLAINE DEBATES
In recent and pending actions, school choice proponents have
charged that the "Blaine Amendments" are relics of anti-Catholic bigotry
that states have continually used to discriminate against religious minori-
ties, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal First
Amendment. In support of their contention, they cite decisions in which
no-funding provisions have been used to block the equal participation of
religious educational institutions on par with similar secular institutions
in programs such as busing, scholarships, and textbook loans. 68 For ex-
ample, in the much-criticized Witters v. State Commission for the Blind69
decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that state support for a
blind man's theology education would violate the state's no-funding pro-
vision, even after the United States Supreme Court held that such aid
would not violate the Federal First Amendment.7 °
60. For example, the Virginia Constitution states:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or minis-
try whatsoever... or the people of any district within this Commonwealth, to levy on
themselves or others, any tax for the erection or repair of any house of public worship, or
for the support of any church or ministry.
VA CONST. art. I, § 16.
61. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73, 82, 85-86 (1989).
62. Id. at 82.
63. Id.
64. Halstead, supra note 8, at 170.
65. Richard D. Komer, School Choice: The State Constitutional Challenge, LIBERTY & L.
(Institute For Justice, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2001, at 4.
66. See Tarr, supra note 61, at 82, 85-86.
67. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 562 (Vt. 1999).
68. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Wash. 1989).
69. 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).
70. Id. (on remand from Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986)); see also Institute for Justice, Ninth Circuit Ruling in Religious Funding Case Could Re-
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Currently, the Becket Fund's complaint in Pucket v. Rounds7'
charges that the South Dakota no-funding provision has been used to
exclude religious schools and children from numerous government bene-
fits, including textbook loans and school busing programs.72 Wherever
state courts hold that state constitutions provide stronger protections
against religion/state entanglement than the Federal Constitution, school
choice and charitable choice proponents argue that no-funding provisions
serve to discriminate against religious minorities. Bound by their preju-
dicial roots, these "Blaine Amendments" allegedly continue to promote
religious discrimination and should be repealed.
However, these arguments lack support. 73 First, many of the provi-
sions which activists term "Blaine Amendments" cannot justifiably be
associated with James G. Blaine and Reconstruction-era anti-Catholic
bigotry. A variety of circumstances spanning the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries surrounded the adoption of state constitutional provisions
restricting public funding of religious institutions.74 Yet activists seem to
apply the Blaine name and taint indiscriminately to rhetorically reinforce
their argument that all of these provisions have prejudicial origins.75 For
this reason, scholars disagree on the number of Blaine Amendments in
existence. For example, the pro-voucher Becket Fund and Institute for
Justice list thirty-seven states that have Blaine Amendments.76 However,
Kotterman v. Killian,77 an Arizona Supreme Court opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the state's school tax credits, mentions only twenty-
nine states that have amendments with the Blaine language.
78
Inclusive definitions encompass state amendments enacted under
circumstances quite different from those surrounding the debate over the
Federal Blaine Amendment. Many of these so-called "Blaine Amend-
ments" and related provisions were enacted before the Federal Blaine
Amendment debate began. Wisconsin's constitution, for example, con-
tains language nearly identical to the Federal Blaine Amendment, but it
was adopted in 1848. 79 Congress mandated similar provisions in the
move "Blaine Amendment" Obstacle to School Choice (July 19, 2002),
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/locke_v_davey/7_19_02pr.html (calling the Washington Blaine
Amendment "one of the most notorious and broadly construed" Blaine Amendments in the nation).
71. Complaint at 22, Pucket v. Rounds, No. 03-CV-5033, (D. S.D. Apr. 2003) (challenging
South Dakota's no-funding provision).
72. Id.
73. See generally Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5.
74. Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 7-17.
75. See Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REv. 117,
123 n.32 (2000) (citing the divergent conclusions of several law review articles of the number of
state constitutional provisions properly called "Blaine Amendments").
76. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments: States (2003),
http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html.
77. 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
78. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
79. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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legislation enabling the statehood of North Dakota, s° South Dakota,"'
Montana, s2 Washington, Arizona, 4 New Mexico,8 5 Utah,86 Idaho, 7 and
Oklahoma,88 and were later ratified as part of the constitutions of those
states. 89 Michiganians, who refused to repeal their no-funding provision
in a 1970 voter proposition, were not affected by the same anti-Catholic
prejudice as Blaine and many of his supporters when reaffirming their
so-called "Blaine Amendment."9 Some states' provisions do not even
have language similar to the original Blaine Amendment, but are dubbed
"Blaine Amendments" because they prohibit public funding of religious
schools.91
States also may have unwittingly adopted no-funding provisions
when copying provisions from other states' constitutions. Borrowing
from other states' constitutions was common practice; a state often bor-
rowed from the constitution of states admitted to the Union just before it,
in hopes of expediting its own admission.92 Wisconsin's constitutional
provisions resemble those of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and its
constitutional convention record, though incomplete, supports the idea
that it borrowed heavily from elsewhere. Wisconsin adopted its bill of
rights, including the provision against public funding of religious
schools, wholesale, without any recorded debate, on the first day of its
constitutional convention.93 States that chose to copy the provisions of
other state constitutions to expedite their admission to the Union cannot
be said to have copied any nascent anti-Catholicism in an "original"
state's provisions.
80. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, ch. 180 (1889) (enabling legislation for North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of
the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451,
458-59 (1988).
84. Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, ch. 26 (1910) (enabling legislation for New Mexico
and Arizona).
85. See also ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 1946-1912 160-
67 (1968) (recounting why New Mexico drafted a constitution containing such a clause in probable
hopes of securing Union acceptance, even though it was so locally unpopular that it was viewed as
likely cause of the constitution's defeat by a vote of New Mexican citizens).
86. Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, part 4, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894) (enabling legislation for
Utah).
87. Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 8, 26 Stat. 215, 216 (1890) (enabling legislation for Idaho).
88. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267, 270 (1906) (enabling legislation for
Oklahoma).
89. Utter & Larson, supra note 83, at 458-69 (listing enabling acts requiring a Blaine-like
provision).
90. Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 551, 588-90 (2003).
91. See Heytens, supra note 75, at n.32.
92. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
93. See Joseph A. Ranney, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, WIS. LAW., Sept. 1,
1992.
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Second, the historical record reveals little to support the argument
that all no-funding provisions were prejudicial in origin. Most state con-
stitutional conventions occurred in the nineteenth century, and records
were kept sparsely, if at all. Convention debates were not recorded ver-
batim, leaving it nearly impossible to determine the intent behind the
adoption of each provision. As historian Philip Hamburger notes, sup-
port of the separation of church and state in the mid-nineteenth century
became a secular, "American" principle, despite the nativist undertones
of the period's movement for religious liberty.94 One cannot know de-
finitively whether the no-funding provisions were passed for anti-
Catholic reasons, out of a desire to separate religion and state, or some
combination of these and other motives.
Third, despite the claims of opponents of the no-funding provisions,
the provisions have not engendered case law that prohibits school choice
and charitable choice. Judicial interpretation is hardly bound by the his-
torical context of a provision's enactment. The similar language of these
provisions does not necessarily signify that they were enacted for a simi-
lar legislative purpose, and certainly does not mean judges will interpret
them similarly in state courts. Even those provisions that closely mirror
the Federal Blaine Amendment have been treated quite differently in the
courts since their enactment. Indeed, some state jurists have lauded their
no-funding provisions for providing protection to religious freedom su-
perior to even the Federal Constitution. For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has touted its no-funding provision as "a more complete
bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any religious sect,
organization, or society than any other state in the Union," which is
hardly a discriminatory interpretation.95
III. COMPARING THE STATE No-FUNDING PROVISIONS
Scholars disagree over the definition of a Blaine Amendment. No
agreement exists as to whether Blaine Amendments are defined by their
textual similarity to the original Blaine Amendment, their restrictiveness
on funding to sectarian institutions, or their alleged anti-Catholic intent.96
Pursuant to Locke v. Davey,97 in which the Supreme Court noted that
Washington's provision was not connected to the Federal Blaine
Amendment because it was derived from the Federal Enabling Act, I
have conducted my own study of state constitutional provisions prohibit-
94. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 192 (2002).
95. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of School Dist. No. Eight of Edgerton, 44 N.W. 967, 977 (Wis. 1890)
(Cassoday, J., concurring) (praising Wisconsin's "Blaine Amendment," which was written before
existence of federal Blaine Amendment).
96. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999); See, e.g., Toby G. Heytens, School
Vouchers and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REv. 117 (2000); The Becket Fund for Religious Lib-
erty, Blaine Amendments, http://www.blaineamendments.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2005) (citing
different numbers of "Blaine Amendments").
.97. 540 U.S. 712, 723 n.7 (2004).
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ing funding to religious institutions. I have surveyed the language in-
volving funding to religious institutions in all fifty state constitutions to
determine which have similar language to the Blaine Amendment and to
differentiate those which were enacted before the 1875 introduction of
the Federal Blaine Amendment.
Approximately thirty-eight states have provisions restricting fund-
ing to religious schools or institutions. 98  Twenty-three of these states
enacted their no-funding provisions between the birth of the 1875 Fed-
eral Blaine Amendment and 1925, at the height of the debate over the
"schools question" in the United States.99 Of these twenty-three states,
eight derived their no-funding provisions directly from the federal ena-
bling acts that granted them statehood. 100 Eleven others re-ratified their
constitutions or amended the no-funding provisions after 1960, signify-
ing their approval of these provisions in a modem context. 10' While the
Federal Blaine Amendment was confined to restrictions of public fund-
ing of schools, twenty-one of the thirty-nine no-funding provisions re-
strict funding to all religious institutions or societies, or any funding that
will be used for a religious purpose. 0 2 Thus, the influence of the Federal
98. ALA. CONST. art. XIV § 263 (1901); ALASKA CONST. art. VII § 1 (1956); ARIZ. CONST. art.
IX, § 10, art. 11, § 12 (1910); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (1879); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34,
art. IX § 7 (1876); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1897); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1838); GA. CONST. art. I, §
1 I XIII (1877); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1959); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1890); ILL. CONST. art. 10
§ 3 (1870); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1816); KAN. CONST. art. VI § 6 (C) (1859); KY. CONST. § 189
(1891); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (1919); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1850); MNN. CONST. art. I, § 16
(1857), art. XIII, § 2 (1857); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 66 (1890), art. 8, § 208 (1890); Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 7 (1875), art. IX, § 8 (1875); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6 (1889); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (1875);
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (1880); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (1877); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (1911);
art. XII, § 4 (1911); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1846); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (1889); OHIO CONST.
art. VI, § 2 (1851); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (1907); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1857); PA.
CONST. art. III, § 15 (1874), art. III, § 29 (1874); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (1889); S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 3, art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1876), art. VII, § 5 (C) (1876); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4
(1895), art. X, § 9 (1895); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (1830); art. VIII, § 10 (1830); WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 11 (1889), art. IX, § 4 (1889); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848); WYo. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. III, §
36, art. VII, § 8 (1890).
99. See sources cited supra note 98.
100. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, ch. 180 (1889) (enabling legislation for North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington); Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, ch. 26 (1910) (ena-
bling legislation for New Mexico and Arizona); Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, part 4, 28 Stat.
107, 108 (1894) (enabling legislation for Utah); Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267,
270 (1906) (enabling legislation for Oklahoma). For additional discussions of Blaine amendments in
some of these states, see Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection
of Religious Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299 (2003); Joseph P. Viteretti, Blaine 's Wake:
School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
657 (1998).
101. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (re-adopted and amended 1974); FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 3 (re-adopted after full debate at Constitutional Convention of 1968); GA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (re-
ratified 1982); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art. XIII, § 2 (constitution generally revised 1972); MONT.
CONST. art. X, § 6 (constitution revised 1972); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § II (amended 1976); NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 10 (re-ratified 1938); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (amended 1978 to remove
discussion of segregation); PA. CONST. art. III, § 29 (amended 1933, 1937, 1963; renumbered 1967);
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1876), art. VII, § 5 (C) (amended 1989).
102. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (1879); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34, art. IX § 7
(1876); GA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1877); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1959); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5
(1890); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (1919); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1857), art. XIII, § 2 (1857); MiSS.
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Blaine Amendment on the fifty state constitutions is indirect and difficult
to trace.
In a comprehensive study of eight representative state Blaine
Amendments, I will show further that these provisions should have little
bearing on school choice and charitable choice debates. I will focus my
analysis on Ohio, Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, Colorado, Michigan,
Vermont, and Maine. I chose these representative states because of their
representative case law, representative types of (or lack of) no-funding
provisions, their geographic diversity,0 3 and the different historical cir-
cumstances surrounding the enactment of their constitutions. Taken to-
gether, the constitutional histories of these eight representative states will
illuminate the ambiguous significance of the no-funding provisions for
school choice and charitable choice debates throughout the country.
A. Basic No-Funding Language
Ohio, Wisconsin, and Arizona all have constitutional language simi-
lar to the Federal Blaine Amendment. Although these state constitutions
were enacted at different times, each state has a provision prohibiting any
"sect" from controlling public school funds, 104 or public funding from
aiding any "sectarian" school. 0 5 Yet the courts of these three states have
ignored both linguistic similarities and diverse histories of these provi-
sions and have construed their "no-funding" provisions in completely
different ways.
1. Ohio
Ohio enacted its no-funding provision in 1851, at the state's second
constitutional convention. 0 6  At the 1873-74 convention to revise the
Constitution of Ohio, a proposition was made to delete the line, "but no
religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or
control of, any part of the school funds of this state.' 1 7 This provision
CONST. art. IV, § 66 (1890), art. 8, § 208 (1890); MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1875), art. IX, § 8 (1875);
OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (1907); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1857); PA. CONST. art. III, § 15
(1874), art. III, § 29 (1874); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3, art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1876),
art. VII, § 5 (C) (1876); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4 (1895), art. X, § 9 (1895); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16;
art. VIII, § 16 (re-ratified 1971); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848).
103. Because states in different regions came into being under very different historical circum-
stances, a better comparison of the history of state no-funding provisions comes from comparing
states in different regions. Moreover, states in similar regions admitted closely in time to one an-
other are more likely to have copied constitutional language from each other, so a comparison of no-
funding provisions in geographically diverse states ensures that similar language was adopted under
different circumstances.
104. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
105. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
106. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51.
107. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1873-74, VOL.
1,77.
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was presented to the convention as a "Catholic measure."'l08 However,
the words of at least one Catholic delegate reveal that the provision did
not receive uniform Catholic support:
So far as I know, [the amendment] was presented without the cogni-
zance, and urged without the indorsement of a single Catholic of this
Convention, other than its author. So far as it assumed to present the
wishes of any other Catholic here, I believe it was an assumption to-
tally unwarranted .... Trusting to my constituency as fair representa-
tives - and I represent as large a proportionate Catholic constituency
as any man on this floor - I do not believe even a minority in num-
bers of Catholics want such change, or any special privilege under
law or Constitution .... We need no special interposition of law or
Constitution in our favor .... That some of the Catholic clergy have
condemned the public schools, and insisted on Catholic schools for
the education of Catholic children, has no bearing on this issue. We
are asking no constitutional mandate to enforce their ideas .... 109
The Convention subsequently failed to adopt the amendment, leaving the
language of Article VI, Section 2 as it stands today.
Thus, the intent behind Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion appears unclear. The provision was both supported and contested by
Catholic and non-Catholic delegates at the 1873-74 constitutional con-
vention - at the same time that the question of public funding to religious
schools was becoming a federal issue. The alleged bigotry behind this
provision is uncertain.
Despite the prohibition on public funding to religious schools in the
Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a state school
voucher programs is permissible. 110 In Simmons-Harris v. Goff,"' the
Ohio Supreme Court was deeply influenced by federal constitutional
jurisprudence when interpreting its state constitution. 12  The court
avoided conflict between the program and the state's no-funding provi-
sion by adopting the federal Lemon test for determining whether the pro-
gram constituted the establishment of religion under both the First
Amendment, the religious freedom provisions of the Ohio Constitu-
tion,113 and the state no-funding provision, which dates to 1851.114 The
108. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITrUrIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1873-74, VOL.
2, pt. III, 2333.
109. Id. (quoting Delegate Jackson).
110. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ohio 1999).
111. 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
112. Id. at 203.
113. The Ohio Constitution states:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support
any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent; and no pref-
erence shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification
for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious
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court found the program constitutional under the United States Supreme
Court's Lemon test, but pointedly noted that it used the Lemon test be-
cause it is a "logical and reasonable method," not because the religion
clauses of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with the federal religion
clauses. 115 The court explicitly "reserve[d] the right to adopt a different
constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether be-
cause the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other rele-
vant reason."'"16 One might speculate about what type of "relevant rea-
son" would cause the Ohio Supreme Court to deviate from federal con-
stitutional jurisprudence in its interpretation of the state constitution,
especially if public opinion had not been so much in favor of taking dras-
tic measures to fix the ailing Cleveland public schools.
In this context of federal influence, the Ohio Supreme Court spe-
cifically discussed the prohibition on the control of state school funds by
religious sects in Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.'" 7  The
court did not consider the history of this provision, perhaps because the
official journal of the state constitutional convention includes no discus-
sion related to its passage." 8 Instead, the court stressed the role of inde-
pendent choice in the Cleveland voucher program, noting that:
[N]o money flows directly from the state to a sectarian school and no
money can reach a sectarian school based solely on its efforts or the
efforts of the state. Sectarian schools receive money that originated
belief, but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Re-
ligion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be
the duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable laws, to protect every religious de-
nomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to en-
courage schools and the means of instruction.
OHIO CONST. art. 1, §7.
114. The Ohio Constitution's no-funding provision states:
The General Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the
income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of
common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever
have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.
OHIO CONST. art. VI, §2.
115. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 211. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the
Court established a three-pronged test for establishment of religion that was the Supreme Court's
standard in establishment clause cases for more than twenty-five years. Id. at 612-13. To pass the
Lemon test, a statute much have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vanced nor inhibited religion, and must not involve excessive entanglement between government
and religion. Id. Although Lemon has not been overruled, it has been modified and criticized in
recent Supreme Court cases, including Zelman. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 212.
117. Id.
118. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, convened
January 9, 1912; adjourned June 7, 1912; reconvened and adjourned without discussion August 26,
1912.
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in the School Voucher Program only as the result of independent de-
cisions of parents and students.1
19
Thus, the voucher program does not violate the state's no-funding
provision, since the sectarian schools do not have an "exclusive right to,
or control of' any part of Ohio's school funds, as forbidden by the state
constitution.120 The United States Supreme Court plurality relied on this
"independent choice" reasoning when later upholding the constitutional-
ity of the program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.1
2'
Since the Supreme Court decided Zelman, the Ohio legislature has
established a Task Force on Nonprofit, Faith-Based and Other Organiza-
tions, 122 which created a Governor's Office of Faith-Based and Commu-
nity Initiatives. 123 The Office is currently involved in an initiative called
the Ohio Compassion Capital Project which grants funds to faith and
community-based organizations. 24 Yet this program may not be permis-
sible under the state constitution.' 
25
Although the Cleveland program is constitutional, the future of
school choice and charitable choice in Ohio remains unclear. Both the
United States Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court holdings in the
Simmons-Harris cases appear limited to the circumstances of the Cleve-
land voucher program. The Ohio Supreme Court even noted that a dif-
ferent school voucher program might damage the funding of public edu-
cation and "could be subject to a renewed constitutional challenge."'
126
This admission, along with the Ohio Supreme Court's explicit reserva-
tion of the right to depart from federal constitutional analysis, allow the
Ohio Supreme Court great flexibility in determining future no-funding
provision decisions. Simmons-Harris v. Goff presents an excellent ex-
ample of how experienced jurists selectively molded state constitutional
language for a specific, narrow purpose.
The Simmons-Harris v. Goff decision exemplifies two techniques
that state supreme courts have used to circumvent the no-funding provi-
sions. First, courts may hold state constitutional provisions to be coex-
tensive with Federal First Amendment standards, either generally or for
the purposes of a single case. 127 Courts may also narrowly interpret "ex-
clusive right to, or control of' funding so that programs which do not
119. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. See also WILLIAM HERBER, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1913: THOROUGHLY ANNOTATED AND INDEXED.
120. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212.
121. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652-60.
122. H.B. 175, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
123. See The Governor's Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
http://www.fbciohio.gov (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
124. Id.
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involve direct funding of religious institutions by the state are deemed
constitutional. 128  Using these methods of analysis, courts can evaluate
school choice and charitable choice programs without considering either
the strict separationist interpretation of the no-funding provision or any
anti-Catholic bigotry in the history of the provision. Thus, courts may
tailor the language of the provision to the circumstances of the specific
voucher program. Under this method, the prejudicial and "threatening"
elements of the no-funding provision are rendered irrelevant, or at least
flexible.
2. Wisconsin
Wisconsin's prohibition of public funding of "religious societies, or
religious or theological seminaries," included in Article I, Section 18 of
the Wisconsin Constitution, 129 was framed long before the Federal Blaine
Amendment, and did not specifically prohibit the funding of religious
schools. 130  An 1846 draft constitution containing this provision failed
primarily due to disagreement over unrelated issues,1 31 and a second con-
stitution was successfully adopted in 1848.132 Unfortunately, the records
of both Wisconsin constitutional conventions leave much room for
speculation as to the original intent behind the state's constitutional pro-
visions. At both conventions, the no-funding provision was grouped as
part of a declaration of rights and adopted with no recorded discussion.
133
However, records of the debates surrounding Article I, Section 18 may
be incomplete. The reporter at the 1847-48 constitutional convention
admits that he often altered the language of the delegates, although he
128. Id. at 212.
129. The Wisconsin Constitution states:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of con-
science shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any
control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any
money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or
theological seminaries.
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18
130. Id.
131. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN:
WITH A SKETCH OF THE DEBATES 8 (1848), microformed on LAC No. 13457 (Library of Am. Civi-
lization) (containing remarks of convention delegate Mr. Kilbourn concerning failures of previous
proposed constitution due to issues on the judiciary, banking, exemption, and property rights of
married women); See also STARK, infra note 174, at 3-4 (indicating that the 1846 constitution failed
at the polls due to three issues: the homestead exemption, the property rights of married women, and
restrictions on banking).
132. Id. at passirn
133. STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, THE CONVENTION OF 1846 (Milo M. Quaife,
ed., 1919); STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION (Milo
M. Quaife, ed., 1919); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR TH4E STATE OF
WISCONSIN, supra note 131, at 51, 143 (indicating how the convention's Committee on General
Provisions drafted the declaration of rights and passed it unanimously before bringing it to the con-
vention floor).
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claims this did not affect the substance of the debates. 134 At least four
delegates also asked for their remarks to be stricken from the record.
1 35
The reporter further warns that the convention did not decide to record its
proceedings until the "business of the convention was considerably ad-
vanced," and so the early debates "are not as full and complete as they
would have been."
136
While the history of these early debates may be particularly vague,
later discussion at the convention on related topics also reveals little con-
troversy or prejudice. The convention record shows no mention of relig-
ion whatsoever in a discussion of common schools and the school
fund. 137 The convention also overwhelmingly voted to forbid sectarian
instruction in public schools and universities immediately after such pro-
posals were made, with no discussion recorded. 38 Historians note that at
the time of the constitutional convention, Wisconsin already had a well-
established tradition of common schools with a universal non-sectarian
tradition, and did not have any parochial school system of note until well
after the constitution was ratified.139 Public education in Wisconsin had
already begun in 1845, and was offered statewide after its codification in
the 1848 constitution. 140  Historian Steven K. Green notes that despite
some tensions between Protestant, Catholic, and Lutheran immigrants,
no evidence exists that the Wisconsin constitution-makers were anti-
religious in drafting the no-funding provisions. 141
The best available insight into the meaning of Article I, Section 18
comes from the Wisconsin Supreme Court's first ruling on this provision
in 1890, just forty-two years after its enactment. In State ex rel. Weiss v.
District Board of School-District No. 8 of Edgarton,142 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court extended Article I, Section 18 to prohibit state funding of
religious activities in public schools and religious schools themselves .
43
134. H.A. TENNEY ET AL., Reporters' Preface to JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN: WITH A SKETCH OF THE DEBATES (1848), micro-
filmed on LAC No. 13457 (Library of Am. Civilization).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE'STATE OF WISCONSIN,
supra note 131, at 321-24.
138. Id. at 336.
139. Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 15; see also ALICE E. SMITH, 1 THE
HISTORY OF WISCONSIN 588-89 (1985); RICHARD N. CURRENT, 2 THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN
162-169 (1976); Brief Amicus Curiae of Historians and Law Scholars on Behalf of Petitioners at 27
n.41, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729 ("placing the devel-
opment of the parochial school systems after the enactment of the 1848 constitution.") (citing Joseph
A. Ranney, "Absolute Common Ground": The Four Eras of Assimilation in Wisconsin Education
Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 791, 793-94, 796-98 (1998)).
140. The Wisconsin Mosaic, A Brief History of Education in Wisconsin (Apr. 17, 2000),
http://www.scils.rutgers.edu/-dalbello/FLVA/background/education.html; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
141. Steven K. Green, Blaming Blaine: Understanding the Blaine Amendment and the No-
Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107, 127 (2004).
142. 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890).
143. Weiss, 44 N.W. at 980 (Conkley, J., concurring).
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The court held that the reading of the King James Bible in common
schools contravened Article I, Section 18, reasoning that bible-reading in
public schools was equivalent to public funds being funneled to religious
schools.' 44 The court held that Article I, Section 18 was adopted as a
protection against this and other encroachments on the religious freedom
of its inhabitants. 145 The court noted that Article I, Section 18 was
framed "with reference to attracting" a heterogeneous mix of settlers to
Wisconsin, including many Catholics and Jews. 146 In his majority opin-
ion, Justice Lyon remarks on what would later be known as his state's
"Blaine Amendment":
What more tempting inducement to cast their lot with us could have
been held out to [new settlers] than the assurance that, in addition to
the guaranties of the right of conscience and of worship in their own
way, the free district schools in which their children were to be, or
might be, educated, were absolute common ground, where the pupils
were equal, and where sectarian instruction, and with it sectarian in-
tolerance, under which they had smarted in the old country, could
never enter? Such were the circumstances surrounding the conven-
tion which framed the constitution. 
147
Thus, the earliest available judicial account of the drafting of Article I,
Section 18 reveals no prejudicial intentions. To the contrary, Wiscon-
sin's so-called "Blaine Amendment" apparently was meant to protect
religious freedom.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Article I,
Section 18 is distinct from the First Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 148 However, the court has repeatedly applied Supreme Court analy-
sis pertinent to the religion clauses of the United States Constitution to
Article I, Section 18, blurring the distinctions between the religion provi-
sions of the two documents. 149 For example, in 1962, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court explicitly noted that its state establishment clause in Arti-
cle I, Section 18 might even be "less flexible" than the First Amend-
ment. 150 However, ten years later, the same court adopted federal consti-
tutional analysis in a challenge to a statute permitting the state to contract
with a church-affiliated university to provide dental education. 151 In its
Article I, Section 18 analysis, the court adopted the Supreme Court's
"primary effect" analysis, noting that the provision's benefits clause "is
144. Id.
145. Id. at 978.
146. Id. at 974.
147. Id.
148. E.g., State ex rel Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1962) [hereinafter
Reynolds]; State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Wis. 1996).
149. See Reynolds, 115 N.W.2d at 761.
150. Id. at 770.
151. See State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, 198 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Wis. 1972) [hereinafter
Nusbaum I].
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not to be read as requiring that some shadow of incidental benefit to a
church related institution brings a state grant or contract to purchase
within the prohibition of the section."' 52 The payments in the dental
education program should not be seen as payments "for the benefit of'
the religious institution, but as payments for the advancement of the den-
tal health of Wisconsin's citizens.'53 Thus, the court found the statute to
serve a "entirely secular and completely valid public purpose" despite the
church/state interaction.'
54
In 1974, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again applied Federal First
Amendment analysis to Article I, Section 18. 155 This time, the court up-
held a program allowing school boards to contract with sectarian institu-
tions to provide for the educational needs of handicapped children under
the state and federal constitutions.' 56 The court first analyzed the Federal
First Amendment challenge, applying the Lemon test, and determined
that the statute satisfied Lemon's requirement of having a primary effect
that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.' 57 The court then noted that
since the religion provisions of the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions
have similar purposes, the Wisconsin Constitution's further prohibition
of the use of state funds to support religious institutions simply encom-
passes the "primary effects" prong of the federal Lemon test.
58
In 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized the distinctness
of Article I, Section 18 from the First Amendment, but then applied fed-
eral constitutional analysis to interpret it.' 59 In State v. Miller,'60 the
court held that requiring Amish citizens to display red reflective tape on
their slow-moving vehicles, in violation of their religious beliefs, vio-
lated the right to freedom of conscience guaranteed by Article I, Section
18.161 The court explicitly based its holding on the guarantees embodied
in the state constitution alone, 162 and discussed at length the distinction
between Article I, Section 18 and the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. 63 The court held that its prior recognition that both clauses
"serve the same dual purpose," and its prior decisions to interpret Article
I, Section 18 "in light of United States Supreme Court Cases," "should
not be read as an abandonment of our long-standing recognition that the
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 655.
155. See State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577, 577 (Wis. 1974) [hereinafter
Nusbaum II].
156. Id.
157. Id. at 582-84.
158. Id. at 585.
159. See Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 238.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 237.
162. Id. at 238.
163. Id. at 238-40.
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language of the two documents is not the same."' 64 The court concluded
that its "analysis of the freedom of conscience as guaranteed by the Wis-
consin Constitution is not constrained by the boundaries of protection the
United States Supreme Court has set for the federal provision. We hold
that our state constitution provides an independent basis on which to
decide this case."' 65 Despite this strong language, 166 the court applied the
United States Supreme Court's compelling interest/least restrictive alter-
native analysis for free conscience claims to the case, "see[ing] no need
to depart from this time-tested standard." 167 Thus, even when their dis-
tinctness has been painstakingly emphasized, the federal and Wisconsin
state religion clauses are intricately related.
In a celebrated 1998 case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again
blurred the relationship between the federal and state religion clauses.
68
In Jackson v. Benson,' 69 the Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association
and a group of students' parents brought suit under Article I, Section 18
to challenge a Milwaukee school voucher program that allows the par-
ticipation of religious schools. 70 The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
the program under the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions, and the
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari fueled speculation that
they would soon declare vouchers constitutional. To avoid a clash with
Article I, Section 18, the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the Wis-
consin Constitution's religion clauses as coextensive with the federal
religion clauses.' 7' Ignoring its holding two years earlier that the two
provisions are distinct, the court grounded its interpretation on its even
earlier statements that the religion clauses of the state and federal consti-
tutions serve the same dual purpose, and that Article I, Section 18 en-
compasses the primary effects test. 172 Since the Milwaukee voucher pro-
gram did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, it did not
violate Article I, Section 18.173 One commentator argues that the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Jackson construed Article I, Section 18 as co-
extensive with the federal religion clauses merely because the plaintiffs
erred by not asserting that the provisions are distinct. 7 4 The court may
have felt bound by a prior holding that it would use First Amendment
analysis to interpret Article I, Section 18 unless directed otherwise by the
plaintiff. 171
164. Id. at 239.
165. Id. at 239-40.
166. Id. at 239.
167. Id. at 241.
168. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 607.
171. ld. at 620.
172. Id.
173. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608.
174. JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 67 (1997).
175. See Lange v. Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143, 148 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
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Although Wisconsin has not yet established a Faith-Based Initiative
liaison in its governor's office, the state has begun funding faith-based
social service programs pursuant to the federal charitable choice laws.
17 6
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. McCallum,'77 one of the few legal
challenges to the constitutionality of Bush's national Faith-Based Initia-
tive, involved a Wisconsin program. 178 Wisconsin funded Faith Works, a
faith-based, long-term alcohol and drug addiction treatment program.
179
The court held that the case did not reach the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the charitable choice law, and then upheld the funding of Faith
Works even though the program resulted in governmental indoctrination
of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 80 Relying on the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mitchell v. Helms,'.' the court
held that the funding was constitutional because all offenders partici-
pated in the treatment program of their own free choice, and that the pro-
gram's safeguards ensured that they made true private choices. 182 The
plaintiff did not invoke Article I, § 18 of the Wisconsin constitution in its
suit. However, future challenges to similar grants from the governor's
discretionary fund to faith-based organizations might do better by invok-
ing the state constitution, which may be more flexible than the federal
religion clauses.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's treatment of Article I, Section 18
allows it to rely on federal constitutional jurisprudence while reserving
the right to construe the provision more strictly in the future. Jackson's
crafty wording does not overrule Weiss, Nusbaum I, Miller and other
cases insisting that Article I, Section 18 is distinct from and stronger than
the federal religion clauses. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted Article I, Section 18 in accordance with federal
constitutional standards, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's repeated insis-
tence that Article I, Section 18 is distinct from the First Amendment
leaves future school choice and charitable choice programs open to po-
tential legal challenge.
3. Arizona
Arizona's no-funding provisions were thrust into its constitution by
Congressional order. 83 The enabling act of 1899 which authorized the
176. Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 964 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (granting partial summary judgment); Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F.
Supp. 2d 905 (W.D.Wis. 2002), aff'd 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 881.
179. Id.
180. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 915, 920.
181. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
182. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
183. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious estab-
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statehood of Arizona and New Mexico contained the proviso that both
nascent states must have constitutional language forbidding public fund-
ing to sectarian schools.18 4 Opponents of the Blaine Amendment claim
that the same anti-Catholic animus behind the federal Blaine Amendment
motivated this mandate to new states in the enabling acts. I8 5 However, a
recent study by historians prepared in an amicus brief to Locke v. Davey
found that no evidence of anti-Catholic bigotry lay behind a similar ena-
bling act for Washington State that same year, 186 and the Supreme Court
noted in a footnote that the history of the federal Blaine Amendment was
not relevant to consideration of Washington's similar provision. 18 7 In
general, the Arizona Constitution borrowed heavily from other states as
its legislature attempted to get the new state off to a swift start, and it is
likely that the no-funding provision was simply lifted without thought
from the Enabling Act. No evidence exists to show that the legislature
gave any more consideration to the issue of public funding to religious
schools than to any other issue. 88 The Arizona Supreme Court, recog-
nizing the difficulty of determining the intent of its constitutional fram-
ers, notes that no comprehensive history of the Arizona constitutional
convention exists.189 "The verbatim transcript of the 1910 constitutional
convention reveals little discussion on the convention floor about the
religion clauses."' 190 In general, when reading through the constitutional
convention proceedings, the court comments that "one is impressed by
the fact that major issues were often glossed over with no debate or dis-
cussion."' 9' Again, the truth about the impetus for the enactment of Ari-
zona's no-funding provision may be undiscoverable.
Arizona does not have a school voucher program, but it has offered
school choice since 1997 in the form of tax credits. 92 Parents who send
their children to private schools, including religious schools, receive tax
credits equal to the amounts of their tuition dollars up to five hundred
dollars.' 93 In 1999, a taxpayer group challenged this program under the
state's no-funding provisions. In Kotterman v. Killian,194 the Arizona
lishment."); ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10 ("No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made
in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.").
184. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (enabling legislation for New Mexico and
Arizona).
185. See Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5.
186. Id.
187. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
188. BRUCE BONNER MASON, REVISION OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY
(1961); JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1993);
MINUTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA (1910).
189. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999) (quoting THOMAS E. SHERIDAN,
ARIZONA: A HISTORY 385 (1995)); MINUTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA
(1910).
190. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 621.
191. Id. at 622.
192. Id. at 610.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 606.
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Supreme Court upheld the program, ruling that no evidence existed that
the framers of the Arizona constitution meant to prohibit tax credits of
this sort, based on their reading of plain meaning of the text of the Ari-
zona Constitution. 195 In doing so, the court effectively held the Arizona
state constitutional provisions coextensive with the federal First
Amendment, noting that no evidence existed of the intent of the Arizona
constitutional framers to exceed the requirement of the federal estab-
lishment clause. 196 The court felt bound by a duty to interpret the state
constitution in light of contemporary circumstances, including the state's
commitment to education and the Supreme Court's allowance of direct
aid programs involving school choice. 1
97
Finally, the majority addressed the state's no-funding provision.
Strangely, while the court was quick to reject the difficulty of discerning
the intent of the framers of the Arizona Constitution, it swiftly dismissed
the state's no-funding provisions as a "clear manifestation of religious
bigotry" and discounted their relevance for constitutional interpreta-
tion.' 98 The court noted that there is "no recorded history directly linking
the [federal Blaine] amendment with Arizona's constitutional conven-
tion." 199 Nevertheless, the court found itself "hard pressed to divorce the
amendment's language from the insidious discriminatory intent that
prompted it," and deemed the state no-funding provisions to have no
bearing on its decision in this case. 200  The same Arizona scholarship
program is currently being challenged in federal court pursuant to the
First Amendment.20 ' However, given the Arizona Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Kotterman and the Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certio-
rari, the program seems likely to stand. Arizona's faith-based initiative
programs, which include the establishment of a liaison in the governor's
office also appear constitutional under Kotterman's interpretation of the
no-funding provisions.20 2
Arizona's Supreme Court remains the most aggressive in its treat-
ment of its no-funding provisions. No other state has deemed its no-
funding provisions irrelevant because of its prejudicial past, without con-
sidering the particularities of the state provision's history. The United
States Supreme Court chose not to involve itself in the Arizona court's
interpretation of its own constitution, denying certiorari in the case.20 3
195. Id. at 623.





201. Winn v. Hibbs, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (remanded to the district court for further proceed-
ings).
202. See The White House, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: State Liaisons or
Offices for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/
contact.html#1iaisons (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
203. See Kotterman v. Killian, 528 U.S. 921 (1999).
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The case is the most powerful ammunition in the arsenal of anti-Blaine
activists.
B. States with Strict No-Funding Provisions
States with strict no-funding provisions, such as Florida, Colorado,
and Michigan, include additional restrictions beyond the basic language
prohibiting funding to religious schools or institutions. These three state
constitutions contain provisions prohibiting any "political subdivision"
204
or "any county, city, town, township, school district, or other public cor-
poration.,'20 5 Michigan is the only state to have an additional constitu-
tional provision explicitly prohibiting school vouchers.0 6 However, state
courts will not necessarily rely on this stringent language when consider-
ing voucher and charitable choice programs.
1. Florida
Currently, Florida is a Blaine battleground, but the history of its no-
funding provision is quite benign. The legal battle over Florida's school
choice program is the most prominent example of the potential force of
no-funding provisions to block school choice programs.
Florida's no-fimding provision was originally enacted in 1838 with-
out any recorded debate.20 7 The original language survived constitutional
revisions in 1861, 1865, 1868, 1885, and 1968.208 A proposal to create a
204. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect,
or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.").
205. For example, the Colorado Constitution states:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or
other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund
or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectar-
ian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, univer-
sity or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian de-
nomination whatsoever, nor shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal
property, ever be made by the state, or any such public corporation to any church, or for
any sectarian purpose.
COLO. CONST. ART. IX, § 7.
206. Michigan's additional constitutional provision states:
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized,
by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indi-
rectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary,
elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deduc-
tions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be pro-
vided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment
of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruc-
tion is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. The legislature may
provide for the transportation of students to and from any school.
MICH. CONST. art, VIII, § 2.
207. FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. I, § 3; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION OF
DELEGATES TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA 2, 16 (St. Joseph, The "Times"
Office 1838).
208. FLA. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 3; FLA. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 3; FLA. CONST. of 1868, § 4;
FLA. CONST. of 1885, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
BLAINE'S NAME IN VAIN?
stronger no-funding provision explicitly prohibiting funding to sectarian
schools failed at the 1885 Florida constitutional convention with no re-
corded debate. 20 9 Thus, Florida's provision appears designed to prohibit
funding of all religious institutions, not just religious schools.
Despite this strict language, Florida state courts have often permit-
ted state funding of religious institutions.210  Florida appellate courts
have approached issues of church-state entanglement using a type of
neutrality analysis, permitting state funds to benefit religion so long as
they have an incidental, but not a primary effect, of advancing religion. 1'
Accordingly, Florida appellate courts have held that a bible distribution
program in public schools is unconstitutional for advancing religion,21 2
but have upheld a county ordinance forbidding alcohol sales on Christ-
mas because it did not amount to tacit endorsement or establishment of
Christianity as an official religion.213 As recently as 2000, Florida appel-
late courts have upheld the constitutionality of statutes that provide indi-
rect benefits to sectarian institutions, such as penalty enhancements for
crimes committed near or involving places of worship.214
Florida courts have stirred controversy by invoking Article IX, Sec-
tion 1 to invalidate Florida's school choice program. The Florida Oppor-
tunity Scholarship Program "OSP" has been hotly contested since its
enactment on June 21, 1999.25 The following day, a coalition of parents,
citizens, and interest groups filed suit, alleging that the program violated
the Florida Constitution.21 6 The program was heavily supported by Gov-
217ernor Jeb Bush as part of his educational reform program, 1 and espe-
cially as education reform continued to be a pivotal issue in the 2002
Florida gubernatorial election.218 The program allows parents of children
in failing schools to transfer their children to higher-performing private
209. JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA 215-16 (N. M. Bowen, State Printers 1885). Mr. Sheats recommended the adoption of art.
IX, § 13, part of Ordinance No. 32:
No law shall be enacted authorizing the diversion or the lending of any county or district
school funds, or the appropriation of any part of the permanent or available school fund
to any other than school purposes; nor shall the same, or any part thereof, be appropriated
to or used for the support of any sectarian school.
Id.
210. See, e.g., Law Cleanup Time, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 4, 2003, at B4.
211. See, e.g., Todd v. State, 643 So. 2d 625, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
212. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 184-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
213. Silver Rose Entm't Inc. v. Clay County, 646 So. 2d 246, 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
214. See Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 883-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding constitu-
tionality of statute enhancing penalties for controlled substance crimes committed near place of
worship); See also Todd, 643 So. 2d at 630 (upholding penalty enhancement for mischief involving
religious property).
215. See, e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
216. Id.
217. Kimberly Miller, State Reviewing Accreditation of Private Schools, PALM BEACH POST,
Dec. 1, 2002, at A34.
218. See Alisa LaPolt, Bush, McBride Spar Over Education, THE NEWS-PRESS, Oct. 7, 2002 at
Al.
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schools, including parochial schools. Most recipients use the scholar-
ship to attend religious schools, angering separationist groups.21 9
In Holmes v. Bush,220 The Florida Circuit Court granted summary
judgment holding that the OSP violates the state's no-funding provision,
Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution.221 The court reasoned
that the funds for the program come directly from the tax revenues of
Florida and its political subdivisions.222 Distribution of the scholarship
funds results in an equivalent reduction of public school funds, and thus
the depletion of the public treasury.223 Although the payments are made
224directly to parents, the parents are required to "restrictively endorse the
warrant to the private school, '225 which constitutes "indirect support"
forbidden by the state constitution.226 Here, the court notes that the
Alaska Supreme Court made a parallel holding on this issue.227 The court
distinguished the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Board of Edu-
cation v. Allen,228 which upheld a New York statute allowing the pur-
chase and loan of school books to parochial school students.229 Unlike
the program in Allen, the OSP was clearly intended to assist parochial
schools, since full tuition to parochial schools is paid under the OSP.
The court noted, however, that the intention of the legislature is always
debatable and is therefore not determinative when deciding the facial
constitutionality of any provision in Florida.230
While the court discounted the legislative purpose behind the OSP
program, it placed great weight on Florida's decision to keep its no-
funding provision when it revised its constitution in 1968.231 The Florida
Constitutional Revision Commission proposed eliminating the prohibi-
tion on governmental aid to religious institutions, but the Florida legisla-
ture acted "to strengthen the restriction and its applicability to 'indirect
219. Linda Kleindienst, For Now, Students Can Use Vouchers, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
Aug. 7, 2002 at Al.
220. Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, at * 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002).
221. Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079, at * 1. The Florida Constitution states:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing
the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2.
225. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(6)(b) (2002) (repealed 2003)).
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 132 (Alaska 1979) (discussed
infra)).
228. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 228 N.E.2d 791, 799 (N.Y. 1967) (upholding a NY
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aid [to parochial schools].' 23 2 This demonstrated a clear intent of the
framers of the 1968 Florida Constitution to restrict state funding of reli-
gious schools. Thus, the Florida state appellate court struck down the
OSP as violative of Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida State Constitu-
tion: Florida's so-called "no-funding" provision.233 The Florida appellate
court, sitting en banc, recently upheld this decision, noting that the his-
tory of the federal Blaine Amendment was not relevant to the case.234
The Florida appellate court's ruling met with political outcry. The
OSP program had been heavily supported in the state legislature as part
of Governor Bush's educational reform package. 235 Governor Bush has
appealed the decision, and the state continues to award opportunity
scholarships pending disposition by the Florida Supreme Court. 2 36 Be-
cause the decision in Holmes v. Bush was released after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Zelman, pro-voucher activists fear that it
may serve as a signpost to other state courts about how courts should
interpret state no-funding provisions in the current establishment clause
climate.237 In Florida, politicians fear that the opinion will destroy other
state programs involving funding to religious institutions.2 38 Some pro-
school choice commentators and activists have assailed the Blaine
Amendment's prejudicial origins, hoping that the no-funding provision
itself will be struck down as unconstitutional, allowing the OSP to con-
239tinue.
The OSP's judicial fate may also bear on Florida's charitable choice
programs. Governor Jeb Bush has embraced his brother's faith-based
initiative, appointing a liaison to faith-based and community organiza-
tions in the governor's office. 240 Governor Bush has also issued an ex-
ecutive order establishing a twenty-five member Advisory Board to keep
him abreast of issues affecting faith and community-based social service
providers. 241 A Florida Supreme Court ruling upholding a strict reading
232. Id.
233. Id. In the lower court proceeding, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their challenge under
Article IX, Section 6 of the constitution, the claim that the OSP violated the provision that the state
school fund only be used for the support and maintenance of free public schools. See Bush, 767 So.
2d at 668.
234. Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 351 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
235. See, e.g., Institute for Justice, Safeguarding Educational Freedom: Latest Legal Show-
down for School Choice Heads to Florida Supreme Court, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/
backgrounder.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
236. See Kleindienst, supra note 219, at Al; See also Linda Kleindienst, Bush Appeals Ruling
that Tossed Vouchers, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2002 at B6.
237. See Kleindienst, supra note 219, at AI.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Law Cleanup Time, supra note 210, at B4.
240. Governor's Faith-Based and Community Advisory Board, http://www.volunteerflorida
foundation.org/about faithbased.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
241. Exec. Order No. 04-245 (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://dms.myflorida.com/dms/
content/download/3403/13438/file.
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of Florida's no-funding provision could endanger these programs, jeop-
ardizing social service provision to Florida's needy citizens.
No Florida Supreme Court precedent provides a controlling inter-
pretation of Article IX, Section 1, leaving the public to speculate on what
the court's decision will be. The Florida Supreme Court is known to
"lean[] left," which many believe will seal the demise of the OSP.
2 42
However, strong political and public support for the program may sway
the court's decision. Following the state's prior case law on Article IX,
Section 1, the Florida Supreme Court could easily uphold the constitu-
tionality of the OSP. 2 4 3 It would argue that the OSP has only an inciden-
tal effect of advancing religion and does not advance religion over non-
religion, and that the program is therefore permissible under the state
constitution. The court might also choose to uphold the program under
its longstanding presumption that challenges to legislative enactments
should always be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the law. 2"
According to the 1944 case Taylor v. Dorsey,245 the court should be lib-
eral in its constitutional interpretation, and the law should not be held
invalid unless it is clearly unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.24 6
The court might use the Taylor principle to construe the no-funding pro-
vision liberally, perhaps coextensively with the federal establishment
clause such that it would permit state funding to religious institutions
under the OSP.
However, it is not likely that the Florida Supreme Court will rely
only on this past analysis. First, most of these appellate cases relied on
the framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.247 While Lemon remained the salient federal doctrine of
establishment clause jurisprudence for more than twenty-five years, the
United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Agostini, Mitchell,
and Zelman have made its current relevance questionable at best.248 Fur-
thermore, the Florida appellate cases above do not explicitly address the
state's no-funding provision. In Holmes v. Bush, the issue had been
raised and briefed by the parties and was the deciding factor in the lower
court's opinion, so the Florida Supreme Court should address it. Alter-
natively, the court might strike down the OSP based on the Florida Con-
stitution's local control provision, recently invoked in a similar case be-
242. Law Cleanup Time, supra note 210, at B4.
243. Id.
244. See Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1944) (en banc).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 317.
247. 403 U.S. 602, 640-42 (1971).
248. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810,
880-81 (2000); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670.
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fore the Colorado Supreme Court.24 9 The political preferences of the
court's members, or public opinion, will be the deciding factor.
2. Colorado
Like Florida, Colorado is currently a hotbed of school choice and
charitable choice activity. Colorado's no-funding provision has sparked
controversy since its inception.250 Hundreds of Catholic and non-
Catholic citizens of Colorado wrote to the Colorado Constitutional Con-
vention of 1875-76 weighing in on both sides of the issue of whether to
"withdraw from the control of the legislature the public school fund,",251
some noting that "free, non-sectarian common schools are essential.,
25 2
The convention noted that the "petitions for and against such division [of
the Public School Fund] contain nearly an equal number of names." 5 3 A
strict no-funding provision barring the legislature and any political sub-
division of the state from funding any sectarian institution was eventually
adopted.254 Some delegates reported that backlash against an aggressive
Catholic bishop, Monsignor Joseph Machebeuf, prompted the passing of
the o-fud~ roviion 255the no-funding provision. Allegedly, Monsignor Machebeuf threat-
ened to tell his constituency not to ratify the constitution unless the relig-
ion provisions contained language to his liking, fueling the other dele-
gates to pass a provision against his interests.256 No evidence exists of
more widespread anti-Catholic animus behind the no-funding provision.
The jurisprudential history of Article IX, Section 7 would not op-
pose school choice and charitable choice programs, despite the state's
restrictive Blaine language. The available state constitutional history
does not elaborate on the enactment of Article IX, Section 7.257 The
most comprehensive treatment of the provision in the state's case law is
in the Colorado Supreme Court case of People ex rel. Vollmar v.
Stanley2 58 in 1927. According to Stanley, the framers of the Colorado
constitution of 1875-76 did not intend for the term "sectarian" to be syn-
onymous with "religious.,, 259 Instead, they meant the common usage of
the term, which specifically referred to the various Christian sects.260
Thus, the state could freely sponsor a program that involved all religions
249. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers and Students, 92 P.3d 933, 937-38 (Colo.
2004) (see discussion infra).
250. COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7 (Dale A. Oesterle & Richard
B. Collins eds., 2002).
251. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLORADO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1875-76, 228 (1876).
See also id., 235-36, 261, 277-78, 295-96, 314, 351.
252. Id. at 277.
253. Id. at 311.
254. Id. at 360-62; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
255. COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 250, at 224.
256. Id. at 211.
257. Id.
258. 255 P. 610, 618 (Colo. 1927).
259. Stanley, 255 P. at 616.
260. Id.
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generally.261 Under Stanley's analysis, a voucher program involving all
religious schools generally would presumptively be constitutional. In
1953, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a school custodian's loaning
his services to a church did not violate the state no-funding provision,
262with little explanation of its reasoning. In 1982, the Supreme Court of
Colorado upheld the Colorado Student Incentive Grant Program, a higher
education tuition aid program that permitted assistance to students at-
tending religious schools.263 The court held that aid to an institution of
higher education will not have the primary effect of advancing religion
unless (1) it is so pervasively sectarian that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission, or (2) if the aid funds a
specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular set-
ting.264 The court thus noted that the program did not violate the state
no-funding provision, especially since it involved only higher education,
the aid flowed to the student and not the institution, and the aid went to
students from both public and private institutions.265 The decision heav-
ily draws on the Lemon test, and this could be grounds for distinguishing
this opinion.
Colorado's voucher program, the Colorado Opportunity Contract
Pilot Program, was passed by the state legislature on March 31, 2003.266
The vote was held among partisan lines, and many constituents did not
approve of the program.267 The goal of the program is "to help close the
achievement gap between high and low-performing students by provid-
ing a broader range of educational options for parents of high poverty,
low achieving students., 268 Under the program, a parent chooses a pri-
vate or sectarian school for his or her child to attend, and participating
school districts pay for education at those private schools.269  Citizen
groups filed suit against the voucher program, alleging the violation of
eight separate state constitutional provisions, including the no-funding
provision.270 However, the court never reached the no-funding argument,
instead invalidating the program based on the "local control" provision
of Article IX, Section 15, a provision found in only five other states.27 '
261. Id. at 618 (upholding a bible-reading program in public schools) (implicitly overruled by
Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 678 (Colo. 1982)).
262. Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Schmidt, 263 P.2d 581, 582 (Colo. 1953).
263. Am. United, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072, 1088 (Colo. 1982).
264. Am. United, 648 P.2d at 1079.
265. Id. at 1082.
266. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-56-101 (2003); see also John J. Sanko & Nancy Mitchell, School
Vouchers March Forward, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 20, 2003, at A4 (discussing passage of
voucher bill).
267. See Eric Hubler, Voters Not Sold on Lawmakers' Voucher Push, Poll Says, THE DENVER
POST, Feb. 14, 2003, at A 14; Nancy Mitchell, Union-Backed Poll Shows Voters Still Wary of Vouch-
ers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 14,2003, at A30.
268. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers and Students v. Owens, No. 03-CV-3734, 2003
WL 23870661, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter, Colorado Congress].
269. Colo. Congress, 2003 WL 23870661, at *1.
270. Id. at *2 (citing violation of COLO. CONST. Art. IX, §7, the state's no-funding provision).
271. The local control provision of the Colorado Constitution states:
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The court found that the program allowed local school boards no discre-
tion over how their money was spent to provide instruction for students
who live in the district, and they found no way to reconcile the constitu-
tional requirement of local control with the program's administration.272
Thus, the voucher program was found unconstitutional, and the rest of
the constitutional challenges to the program were rendered moot.
273
On June 28, 2004, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld this analysis
274and struck down the program based on the "local control" provision.
Although the Colorado Opportunity Scholarship program does not apply
to higher education, the court's analysis is otherwise directly applicable
to Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program and would bear toward
its constitutionality.
The local control provision would not affect the constitutionality of
Colorado's charitable choice programs. Governor Bill Owens has estab-
lished a liaison in his office to the faith and community-based organiza-
275tions. The Colorado Workforce, Faith and Community Works Initia-
tive, a state agency, has received a $1.3 million dollar grant from the
federal Compassion Capital Fund to improve relations with faith-based
and non-profit organizations.276 The status of these programs under the
state constitution has not yet been challenged.
3. Michigan
Michigan's no-funding provision is strictest and perhaps the least
ambiguous in the country. In addition to a general prohibition on state
funding of sectarian institutions, the Michigan provision specifically
excludes tuition voucher programs that assist with payment for nonpublic
schools, in an amendment that was ratified by a popular vote in 1 9 7 0 .
277
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of con-
venient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three
or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall
have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15. The five other state provisions are: FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (providing
local school boards "shall operate, control and supervise" district schools); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V
Par. I (vesting local boards with authority to "establish and maintain" district schools); KAN.
CONST. art. VI, § 5 (providing local public schools "shall be maintained, developed and operated by
locally elected boards"); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 8 (vesting "supervision and control of schools" in
local boards); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (vesting "supervision of schools" in local boards).
272. Colo. Congress, 2003 WL 23870661, at *12.
273. Id.
274. Owens, 92 P.3d at 944.
275. See The White House, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: State Liaisons or
Offices for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/
contact.html#liaisons (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
276. Press Release, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, Colorado Government to
Strengthen It's [sic] Partnerships with Faith-Based Community Organizations to Better Serve Cus-
tomers (July 2, 2002), available at http://www.coworkforce.com/News/fbco.asp.
277. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970).
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Michigan's prohibition of state funding to religious institutions has
deep roots. The original Michigan constitution of 1835, well before the
federal Blaine Amendment was created, provided that "No money will
be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies., 278 The
provision was enacted before the state had any significant number of
parochial schools and before the wave of Catholic immigration. 279 More
"traditional" Blaine language appeared in 1850 - still before the creation
of the federal Blaine Amendment - and again in 1908. That same lan-
guage was ratified when the entire constitution was amended in 1963.280
However, in 1970, the state legislature passed Public Act 100, which
allowed direct financial support by the state to eligible private schools.28'
A "Council Against Parochiaid" quickly organized to ensure that this
money would not flow to specific institutions instead of religious schools
in general.282 The Council succeeded in getting its propositions onto the
popular ballot, and the strengthened Blaine Amendment passed amid
much controversy. Called upon to clarify the meaning of the provision,
the Michigan Supreme Court held in 1971 that despite the "utter and
complete confusion" of the campaign, the voters had definitively rejected
parochiaid, or public aid to religious schools.
283
In 2000, Michigan voters overwhelmingly defeated a ballot proposi-
tion that would have approved a school voucher program and overruled
the state's no-funding provision.28 4 Since then, Republicans have over-
taken both houses of the state legislature, but Governor Jennifer Gran-
holm opposes school choice, so little political activity over vouchers is
occurring in the state.285 However, Governor Granholm has established a
liaison to faith and community-based organizations within her office and
is hosting an annual conference for these groups.286 Michigan boasts
little case law on its no-funding provision, perhaps because it has clari-
fied the intent of the provision, implicitly or explicitly, about every fifty
278. MICH. CONST. OF 1835, art. I. § 5 (repealed 1850).
279. Steven K. Green, Blaming Blaine: Understanding The Blaine Amendment and the No-
Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107, 126 (2004).
280. SUSAN P. FINO, THE MICHIGAN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 166 (1996).
281. MATTHEW J. BROUILLETTE, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, SCHOOL CHOICE
IN MICHIGAN: A PRIMER FOR FREEDOM IN EDUCATION 14 (1999),
http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=2027.
282. Id.
283. Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Att'y Gen., 185 N.W.2d 9, 17 (Mich. 1971).
284. Albert Menendez & Edd Doerr, Americans for Religious Liberty, Article - School
Vouchers: Voters Say No, http://www.arlinc.org/articles/article-voterssayno.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2005); In 2000, Californians defeated Proposition 38, which would have created a public school
voucher program. Id. California also rejected a proposal that would have eliminated its provision
restricting funding to religious schools in the 1982 general election. The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, Blaine Amendments: States (2003), http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states-files/
CA.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
285. Educationreport.org, Gubanatorial Candidate Profiles: Granholm, http://www.mackinac.
org/pubs/mer/article.asp?ID-4618 (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
286. The Official State Of Michigan Website, Granholm Administration to Host Faith-Based
Resource Symposium, Create Office of Community and Faith-Based Initiatives,
http://www.michigan.gov/som/0,1607,7-192-- 112680--,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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years. However, Michigan boasts other constitutional provisions that
could block school choice and charitable choice programs. For example,
the Michigan constitution has a compelled support provision,287 which
prohibits the use of public funds to aid private schools "directly or indi-
rectly," whether or not the schools are sectarian. 288 A decision striking
down any Michigan school choice or charitable choice program might
rest on these constitutional provisions, and the courts would not need to
delve into Blaine's controversial history.
C. States Without No-Funding Provisions
States without no-funding provisions fall into two categories: those
with and without compelled support provisions. States with compelled
support provisions will find that their compelled support provisions are
the most formidable opponents to voucher programs in their state consti-
tutions, especially after the Vermont Chittenden2 89 case. For the states
with neither no-funding provisions nor compelled support provisions, the
lack of constitutional obstacles paves the way for public debate over
school choice programs.
1. Vermont
Vermont's Constitution today is nearly identical to the original en-
acted in 1777. It bears many similarities to other colonial constitutions,
and borrowed heavily from the original constitution of Pennsylvania.
290
Few cases were litigated under its Compelled Support clause until the
Chittenden case in 1999.291 The town of Chittenden had no high school,
so it paid tuition to public high schools or approved independent high
schools for the education of students in its school district. 9 2 When the
Chittenden school board modified its policy to allow for tuition reim-
bursement to sectarian schools, the Commissioner of Education termi-
nated state aid to the district, and the Chittenden school board brought
suit to declare its program constitutional.293 In its opinion, the Vermont
Supreme Court sought to understand the meaning of the Compelled Sup-
port clause by analyzing its plain language, its history, and its usage in
similar cases in other states.
The court commenced a thorough review of the influences on the
Vermont constitution, determining that the historical records of other
colonial constitutions in Pennsylvania and Virginia would have forbid-
den state aid to sectarian schools.294 The Vermont Supreme Court re-
287. MICH. CONST. Art. I, § 4.
288. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2, c. 2.
289. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ. 738 A.2d 539, 542 (Vt. 1999).
290. See Chittenden Town, 738 A.2d at 556.
291. Id. at 547-49.
292. Id. at 542.
293. Id. at 543.
294. Id. at 556-59.
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viewed the Wisconsin court's decision in Jackson v. Benson295 and the
Ohio decision in Simmons-Harris v. Goff, carefully delineating the dif-
ferences between the Wisconsin and Vermont constitutions that necessi-
tated a different opinion.296 The Vermont Supreme Court specifically
refused to equate its state religion clauses with the federal religion
clauses, as the Ohio and Wisconsin courts had done in Simmons-Harris
and Jackson, because of Vermont's unique history and the historical re-
cord.297 Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court invalidated the Chittenden
Town tuition-reimbursement program based on the compelled-support
clause.298 Based on the Vermont Court's reasoning and insistence on
having an independent interpretation of the state constitution, this deci-
sion seems unlikely to change in light of the United States Supreme
Court's subsequent decision permitting vouchers in Zelman.
2. Maine
James G. Blaine's home state has no "Blaine Amendment" and no
compelled support provision. Despite this lack of restriction, the state
does not fund religious schools 299 and boasts little charitable choice ac-
tivity. Parochial schools may not participate in Maine's rural tuition-
reimbursement program. 300  Like Vermont, Maine permits those towns
which cannot support high schools to pay tuition for their pupils at other
approved area schools. 30 1 The exclusion of religious schools from this
"tuitioning" program has withstood challenge in both state and federal
court. In 1999, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the federal
free exercise clause did not prevent Maine from excluding religious
302 Ataschools from the tuitioning program, and that direct payments to reli-
gious schools would be impermissible under the Supreme Court's estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence. 0 3 Additionally, in Strout v. Albanese °4
the federal First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prohibition
against religious school participation in the program did not violate the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment because the grants could not
be given to the schools consistently with the establishment clause. 305 The
court noted that "there is no binding authority for the proposition that the
295. 578 N.W.2d 602, 632 (Wis. 1998).
296. Chittenden Town, 738 A.2d at 559-60.
297. Id. See also id at 566 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("It is preferable that our interpretation of
the Vermont Constitution be distinct and freestanding, and that the Court articulate the adequate and
independent state grounds for decisions when the Vermont Constitution is invoked.").
298. Id. at 564.
299. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 130-31 (Me. 1999).
300. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 130-3 1.
301. Id. at 130.
302. Id. at 136.
303. Id. at 147.
304. 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
305. Strout, 178 F.3d at 61.
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direct payment of tuition by the state to a private sectarian school is con-
stitutionally permissible."
30 6
In its first post-Zelman "counteroffensive" designed to strike down
barriers to school choice throughout the nation,3 °7 the Institute for Justice
recently filed another lawsuit challenging the exclusion of religious
schools from Maine's tuitioning program.308 However, Zelman is
unlikely to have changed either the state or federal court's analysis of the
Maine tuitioning program. The program in Zelman dealt with indirect
aid to religious schools, while the Maine program dealt with direct aid.
Indeed, the Court's recent decision in Locke v. Davey30 9 further supports
the Strout decision, since it finds no free exercise violation where the
establishment clause reaches.
D. Other States
Recent school choice litigation has also occurred in Pennsylvania
and Illinois. In Pennsylvania, a suburban Philadelphia school district
approved a tax benefit program for families who send their children to
private schools or public schools in other districts. 310 The teachers' un-
ion successfully challenged the program on state constitutional grounds,
with the state appellate court holding that the legislature did not intend,
expressly or impliedly, to permit the school district to create such a tax
credit program. 1 ' The state's no-funding provision did not factor into
the Pennsylvania court's decision in this case. The school district chose
"not to appeal [the] case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court." 312
In Illinois, the state's no-funding provision was at issue in a chal-
lenge to an Illinois state tax credit program.313 Under the program, en-
acted in 1999, parents could receive a 25% income tax credit for expen-
ditures related to sending their children to private schools, a credit of up
to $500 per family. 314 Keith Griffith and Terry Williams, a public school
teacher and a parent of children attending public school, respectively,
immediately challenged the program alleging that the program violated
the religious establishment provisions of the Illinois constitution, includ-
306. Id. at 60-61.
307. Institute for Justice, Vindicating the Supreme Court: Fighting for Parental Liberty by
Stopping Religious Discrimination, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/maine2/backgrounder.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005).
308. Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 90 (2003).
309. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
310. Giacomucci v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 742 A.2d 1165, 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
311. Giacomucci, 742 A.2d at 1167.
312. Institute for Justice, School Choice Cases: Southeast Delco, Pennsylvania School Choice,
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/pennsylvania/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
313. Griffith v. Bower, 747 N.E.2d 423,425 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
314. Griffith, 747 N.E.2d at 425.
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ing the state's no-funding provision.31 5  The program was upheld on
summary judgment and certiorari was denied.
316
The Becket Fund, a non-profit law firm that seeks to protect "the
free expression of all religious traditions, 317 has recently filed lawsuits
challenging no-funding provisions in South Dakota and Massachusetts.
As mentioned above, Becket has filed a case in Pucket v. Rounds
318
charging that the South Dakota no-funding provision has been used to
exclude religious schools and children from numerous government bene-
fits, including textbook loans and school busing programs. 319 The suc-
cess of this case appears unlikely. South Dakota's no-funding provision
originated in the same enabling act as Washington's no-funding provi-
sion, so the South Dakota courts will likely follow Washington's strict
interpretation of its no-funding provision.
The strict Blaine state of Massachusetts also boasts a line of case
law that interprets its no-funding provision strictly and is quite restrictive
of school choice. 320 However, the Becket Fund recently filed litigation in
an attempt to pave the way for Massachusetts' first voucher program;32 a
group of parents wants to repeal a 1917 constitutional amendment that
currently bars referenda on the question of school choice. 322 The consti-
tutional provision forbids referenda on any law that relates to "religion,
religious practices, or religious institutions. 323 The Becket fund claims
that the anti-aid provision, like the federal Blaine Amendment, was
adopted as a result of anti-Catholic animus and asks for it to be struck
down under the free exercise and equal protection clauses.324 Although
the lawsuit itself has nothing to do with the state "Blaine Amendment,"
the Becket fund links the case to the Blaine Amendment discussion on its
websites and refers to it as a Blaine Amendment "forerunner. 3 25 The
315. Id. at 425.
316. Id. at 426-27.
317. Becket Fund Home Page, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php (last visited on Sept. 30,
2005).
318. The Becket Fund, Pucket v. Rounds, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/13.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., Bloom v. School Committee of Springfield, 379 N.E.2d 578, 579, 586 (Mass.
1978) (holding that a statute requiring school committees to loan textbooks to pupils attending
private schools, sectarian or nonsectarian, violates the state no-funding provision); Collins v. Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth, 556 N.E.2d 348, 348 (Mass. 1990) (upholding an article of the state
constitution excluding from the referendum process any law relating to religion, religious practices,
or religious institutions).
321. The Becket Fund, Wirzburger v. Galvin, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/6.
html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
322. Id.
323. Boyette v. Galvin, 311 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239 (D. Mass. 2004), on appeal sub nom Wirz-
burger v. Galvin, No. 04-1625 (1st Cir., filed May 19, 2004) (quoting MASS. CONST. amend, art. 48,
pt. 2, § 2).
324. The Becket Fund, Wirzburger v. Galvin, supra note 321.
325. Becket Fund Home Page, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
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Becket Fund's publicity of this case exemplifies broad use of the Blaine
name to tie other school choice cases to alleged religious bigotry.326
IV. ANALYSIS: A POTENT WEAPON?
No-funding provisions by themselves should not serve as the fore-
most obstacle to school choice and charitable choice programs through-
out the country. In the hands of a savvy court, even those no-funding
provisions with the strongest wording will not prevent such programs
from passing. As the examples above indicate, the history of the state
no-funding provisions is not dispositive of their final adjudication.
Sparse constitutional records and indecipherable legislative motives are
hardly a basis for a modem court to make a reasoned decision. No states
observe prohibitions on "sectarian" funding as black-letter law that re-
stricts all funding of religious institutions. What time's passage has not
turned to gray, judges' motivations may erase completely. State jurists
will be free to decide the fate of school choice and charitable choice pro-
grams based on their own political leanings. Whether judges decide to
uphold or strike down school choice and charitable choice programs,
they will have plenty of constitutional and jurisprudential ammunition
for doing so.
A. How Courts May Uphold School Choice and Charitable Choice Pro-
grams Despite the No-Funding Provisions
State jurists who want to uphold school choice and charitable choice
programs have several options for doing so before they must even reach
the state no-funding provisions. First, a jurist might root her argument in
the free exercise clause of the state or federal constitutions by arguing
that parents have the right to freely exercise their religious beliefs by
choosing to send their children to a religious school on equal terms with
a non-religious school. After Zelman and Davey, an open question re-
mains as to whether state or federal free exercise clauses would permit a
state to exclude religious schools from participating in a school choice
program. A circuit split exists on this question at the federal level. In
Peter v. Wedl,327 the Eighth Circuit held that the free exercise clause
barred a state from denying aid to disabled children attending religious
schools that they would receive if they attended non-religious private
schools.328 On nearly identical facts, the Ninth Circuit held the follow-
ing year that denying such aid did not constitute a free exercise viola-
326. See also The Heritage Foundation, School Choice: About the State Profiles,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/SchoolChoice/AboutStateProfiles.cfm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005) and Daniel McGroarty, N.Y. Bishops & the Blaine Truth, Milton & Rose D. Fried-
man Foundation, http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/news/2002-09-06.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
327. 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
328. Peter, 155 F.3d at 997.
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tion.329 The Supreme Court temporarily let the question stand, denying
certiorari in 2000.330
Many states have attempted to strengthen their free exercise guaran-
tees beyond those of the federal free exercise provisions by passing state
versions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 331 after the
federal RFRA was struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores.332  States
passed RFRAs in response to what many viewed as a curtailing on free
exercise guarantees in the wake of Employment Div. v. Smith.333 Illi-
nois,334 Ohio,3 35 and other state courts also acted to bolster their free ex-
ercise guarantees since Smith. The Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly
rejected Smith and developed its own standard for evaluating whether
state laws adversely affect religion.336
State jurists who choose this way of justifying school voucher pro-
grams despite state no-funding provisions would couch their arguments
in terms of a recent trend among state supreme courts to use state consti-
tutions as a source of positive rights.337 Under this model, free exercise
is a positive right granted by state constitutions upon which neither state
anti-establishment provisions nor the federal establishment clause may
infringe. The state jurist would have to establish free exercise as a
paramount right that would supersede any rights guaranteed by the no-
funding provision.
A state court may also interpret the no-funding provisions to permit
school choice and charitable choice programs. Most commonly, courts
have declared the religion clauses of the state constitution coextensive
with the federal religion clauses. The Ohio, Wisconsin, and Arizona
courts have used this tactic.338
Courts can also interpret the no-funding provision narrowly so that
the school choice plan does not violate the no-funding provision. For
329. WJM ex rel. KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).
330. WJM, 531 U.S. at 1010.
331. See, e.g., Illinois RFRA, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (2005).
332. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
333. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
334. Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961,
993-94 (N.D. Il. 2003).
335. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ohio 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 263.
336. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
337. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1156 (1999); Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are
Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993).
338. Other courts that have held their religion clauses to be coextensive with federal religion
clauses at various times include: Illinois (People v. Falbe, 727 N.E.2d 200, 207 (Ill. 2000) (estab-
lishment provisions same)); North Carolina (Appeal of Springmoor, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C.
1998) (adopting law of both Religion Clauses)); Tennessee (State v. Medicine Bird Black Bear
White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 761 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (free exercise principles same)); and Lou-
isiana (Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 n.5 (W.D. La. 2001) (La. and
federal establishment clauses identical)).
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example, in Simmons-Harris v. Goff, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the school choice plan does not violate the no-funding provision because
school funds would only reach sects through the "independent decisions
of parents and students. 339 Since only school choice programs involving
indirect aid are constitutional under Zelman, most future school choice
programs will likely involve indirect aid, and this analysis will be appli-
cable. State courts may also apply this rationale to uphold charitable
choice programs that involve indirect aid to religious organizations.
Finally, courts who wish to uphold school voucher programs may
declare the no-funding provision unconstitutional or irrelevant due to its
prejudicial origins, as the Arizona Supreme Court did in Kotterman.
Some activists cite two United States Supreme Court cases as providing
support for this approach. In Hunter v. Underwood,34 ° the Supreme
Court invalidated an Alabama criminal disenfranchisement statute, hold-
ing that it was racially motivated at its inception and continued to have a
racially disparate impact.341 Similarly, anti-Blaine activists might argue
that the no-funding provisions were motivated by anti-Catholic bigotry
and that they continue to have disparate impact on Catholic schools,
which still comprise most religious schools in the United States.
Some scholars also cite the more recent case of Romer v. Evans,
342
in which the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado ballot proposition
that invalidated a state constitutional amendment barring state actors
from granting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals protection and rights as a
class.343 The Court held that the statute had the discriminatory effect of
denying a class of people protection from discrimination, a clear viola-
tion of equal protection.344 However, to analogize the no-funding provi-
sion cases to Hunter and Romer, challengers would have to definitively
prove the anti-Catholic history of the no-funding provisions. Challengers
would also have to show that the no-funding provisions in each state
were directed against Catholics as a class, and not just religion in gen-
eral, and continue to have disproportionate impact against Catholics as a
class, and not just parochial schools. This task may not be possible given
the complex history of the Blaine provisions and their differential treat-
ment in the individual states. The Kotterman decision cites neither
Hunter nor Romer, and thus provides the least complicated option for
striking down no-funding provisions, although it is the least authorita-
tive.
339. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999).
340. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
341. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232-33.
342. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
343. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
344. Id.
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B. How Courts May Strike Down School Choice and Charitable Choice
Programs without Reaching the No-Funding Provisions
State jurists that wish to strike down school choice or charitable
choice programs still need not reach the no-funding provisions. State
courts have many other constitutional options that they can use to invali-
date school choice programs. The local control provision used by the
Colorado court to strike down the state's voucher program without reach-
ing its no-funding provision can be found in only six other states. How-
ever, the compelled support provision can be found in twenty-nine states
and presents a more powerful alternative for striking down school choice
programs. The Chittenden case in Vermont demonstrates how a Com-
pelled Support clause alone can invalidate a school choice program.
A state court might also claim that the state's anti-establishment
provisions are more expansive than the federal establishment clause and
thus do not permit school choice and charitable choice programs. While
such a use of state anti-establishment provisions would be bold and per-
haps unprecedented, nothing in Zelman forbids a state anti-establishment
provision from being stronger than the federal anti-establishment provi-
sion and therefore being used to strike down a voucher program, as long
as it does not violate the federal free exercise clause. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Locke v. Davey345 also gives state supreme courts tacit
permission to interpret their state constitutional provisions as stronger
than the federal establishment clause.346
CONCLUSION: DON'T BLAME BLAINE
Analyzing the history of eight so-called Blaine Amendments does
not reveal them to be legislatively enacted bigotry. Blaine Amendment
opponents have never explained how the no-funding provisions have
consistently been used in a prejudicial manner that is directly traceable to
their anti-Catholic roots. State no-funding provisions may or may not
have been passed because of anti-Catholic animosity on the part of some
or all voters. Courts in the past may or may not have interpreted their
no-funding provisions according to their own prejudicial motivations.
And all of this may or may not matter when no-funding provisions come
before politically active judges with an array of options for interpretation
at their fingertips. Moreover, Blaine Amendment opponents do not have
a compelling argument as to why state constitutions cannot protect sepa-
ration of religion and state more strictly than the federal constitution. As
state courts increasingly interpret state constitutional law to create and
enforce rights for state citizens, such an argument seems increasingly
345. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
346. Locke, 540 U.S. 712 at 718-19.
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difficult to make.34 7 Given the array of judicial options for circumvent-
ing, invalidating, or even ignoring state no-funding provisions, the fed-
eral Blaine Amendment simply cannot be blamed for halting school
choice in the states. The name of Blaine seems mainly used in vain.
Where history is indecisive, activists on both sides of the school
choice debate should bury the past and focus on the present. The true
legislative intent behind all state no-funding provisions cannot be un-
earthed by any amount of historical digging, and should not be rewritten
by partisan rhetoric. Debate over school choice belongs outside the
courts and in the public realm, where the competing values of freedom of
religion, freedom from religion, and superior education can manifest
themselves at the polls. Only then can we know the true legislative in-
tent behind the parochial school programs of today. We will also know
the popular view on whether freedom from religion is meant to trump the
value of saving failing schools, which can guide state courts in interpret-
ing their constitutional provisions. By keeping school choice out of the
courts and in the democratic arena, if school choice activists fail, they
cannot blame Blaine, but only themselves.
347. See Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 211 (2003).
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